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We  need  to know  more  about  individual  citizens'  responses  to
macroeconomic  choices  - about the political  economy  of
public  economics.
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In this essay, Catsambas  explores  theoretical  benefits,  as perceived  by citizens.  Would  a well-
concepts  behind  the current  debate on govem-  to-do  citizen, who  could afford private  security
ment growth,  public sector  inefficiency,  and the  gaards, make the same evaluation  about  public
role  of fiscal  policy with a view to raising  the  security  that a poor citizen would  make? In
most important  issues  relevant  for fiscal policy.  general,  what considerations  affect  a person's
He examines  theories  of public  sector  growth,  desire for a given  amount  of public spending,
the evaluation  of benefits  from government  and what are the important  parameters  that
spending,  and the response  of the private  sector  analysts  should  take into account  in their investi-
to govenmment  activities.  gation?
Three principal  reasons  have been  suggested  Catsambas  also explores  the issues  behind
to explain public  sector  growth: conscious  the private  sector's response  to government
govemment  choices,  political  pressure  from  activities  and argues against  a mechanistic
interest  groups,  and the self-interest  of bureau-  approach  to the interaction  between the  private
cracies.  One may ask: Is the growth  of the public  and the public sector.  Unless  decisionmakers  are
sector  a response  to public demand  or the result  relatively  certain  about  how citizens  evaluate
of govenmuent  waste and inefficiency?  In terms  govemment  actions,  citizens  may respond  in a
of the agent-principal  theory,  bureaucrats  who  way  that nullifies  the government  action.
are supposed  to serve  as agents for citizens  may
not necessarily  do so -- which is where waste  Catsambas  concludes  that more empirical
comnes  in. If bureaucrats  are interested  in the  work  is needed  on measuring  citizens' response
nonpecuniary  benefits  of their bureaus,  they will  to public sector  activities.  And fiscal  policy,
have an incentive  to maximize  their activities  and  especially  on expenditures,  should be modeled
budgetary  allocation  rather  than their operating  on a disaggregated  basis to isolate  hypotheses
efficiency.  about  potential  private sector  responses  to
individual  public  programs.
In discussing  the evaluation  of public
programs,  Catsambas  focuses  on the "true"
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1.  Introduction
In the sphere of economic  theory two major developments  have marked the evolution
of economic  reasoning in the past two decades: First, the integration of macroeconomics
with microeconomics,  or, alternatively, the increasingly  deeper investigation  of individual
behavior as a prerequisite for macroeconomic  analysis.  Second, the renewed interest in the
fundamental  principles of political  economy, especially  in the area of public economics.
Examples of the first development  would be the theory of rational expectations, which
explains economic  behavior under perfect rationality  and perfect foresight, and the principal-
agent relationship, which seeks to explain economic  behavior  when the actions of individuals
are interrelated in a world of costly and imperfect  information. An example of the second
development  would be the theory of public choice, which has gained wider recognition since
1986 as the area for which the Nobel Prize in Economics  was awarded that year.
In the sphere of economic  policy, particularly  fiscal policy, attention in the recent past
has focused  on the growth of the public sector and the effectiveness  of fiscal measures  within
the context of stabilization  policy.  Combining  elements of classical macroeconomic  theory
with stiands of recent theoretical  advances, researchers  have attempted to analyze, first, the
reasons behind the observed growth of government  and, second, the circumstances  under
which fiscal policy does or does not have a desirable impact on macroeconomic  activity.
This essay discusses  the conceptual  issues behind the current lively, and sometimes
controversial, debate on government  growth, public sector inefficiency, and the role of fiscal
policy.  It does not provide cut-and-dry  answers to policy questions--if  only because many
issues remain unanswered  and a lot of research is still going on.  The purpose of this article
is to provide a guided tour in some  of the most advanced  areas of current econornic  thinking
and to explore their implications  for future policy guidelines.
1/  Views  expressed  in this paper represent  the opinions  of the author and, unless  otherwise  indicated, should  not be
interpreted  as official World Bank  views.- 2 -
2.  The growth of Government
Much attention  has been given to the question  of public sector growth in recent
years. 2 In this century public expenditures  in nearly all countries have grown faster than
national income and, in many cases, the growth of government has accelerated  after World
War II.  At the same time, there have been large disparities  in levels and rates of growth in
government  across countries. Why has government  expenditure  grown relatively faster than
GNP?  Why does the size of the public sector begin to grow at a more rapid rate at a
particular point in time?  What explains the differences  observed among countries?
Many authors have tried to answer these and similar questions with varying degrees
of success. The main obstacles  have been conceptual  issues related to the nature of
government  activities, and difficulties  in measuring  public sector output.  Nonetheless,  three
principal reasons have emerged as possible  explanations  of public sector growth:
(a) conscious social choices of governments,  (b) pressures from interest groups, and (c) the
role of the bureaucracy.
By the term "social choices " we mean the conscious decision by Governments  to
provide an increasingly  larger amount of goods and services through the Government  budget.
Until the early 1970s the expansion  of public sector activities took place within a stable
economic  environment  and against the background  of historically  unprecedented  rates of
economic  growth.  The primary concern of Governments,  especially those of newly formed
nations, was to improve living standards and consolidate  gains in social equity.  The
principal issues during the decades of the 50s,  60s and early 70s were how to rank national
priorities and how to divide the growth dividend. However, very few people questioned the
desirability  of state expansion.  It was not until the two oil crises of the mid- and late-70s
that the external financial  constraints led many countries to re-evaluate  the role of the public
sector.
By the term "pressures from interest groups" we mean budgetary decisions  that are
based not on economic  but, rather, on political  criteria.  Unlike the private arena, where
profit maximization  and the promotion of marketable  skills are the basic criteria for decision-
making processes, governments  respond to ballots and political influence. The existence  of
interest groups--from small business  associations  to powerful petroleum conglomerates--may
influence  adversely the efficiency  of government  production. If legislation is influenced  by
pressure groups, there is an obvious suspicion  of "pork-barrel" spending  on special interests
at the expense of prudent fiscal management.
Finally, the "role of the bureaucracy" in the growth of the public sector has been
receiving  increasing  attention since the publication  of the influential  book by Niskanen
2/  Jack Diamond [19891 provides a concise treatment of a basic theoretical model, which is empirically tested in the
Group of Scven countries.  Among the many works in this area, classic texts include the contributions by Niskanen
[19711 and Buchanan and Tullock [19851. A recent analysis with many theoretical insights may be found in
Schultze [19921.[19711,  which formalized the behavior  of government bureaus in organizing  the production of
goods and services.  According  to his analysis, bureaucrats have no incentives  in running an
efficient operation, since they cannot keep the "profits" that accrue to their own bureaus.  C i
the other hand, the prestige and often money income itself are positively associated  with the
size of the bureau.  Based on such considerations,  Niskanen  argues, bureau heads try to
maximize the size of the organization  which they control, usually  at the expense of efficiency
considerations. Such behavior, if actually descriptive  of reality, may imply spending  a much
larger amount than necessary  to provide a given amount of output, since bureaus intend to
maximize revenue, rather than profits from their sales.
3.  Waste in Government: The principal-agent  relationship
This reasoning  of bureaucratic  behavior, which in its earlier form was described by
Niskanen, was given a new thrust under the approach known  as the principal-2gent  relation
in the literature of economic theory.  In its simplest form, the agency relationship  involves
the presence of two individuals,  of whom one depends on the action of another.  The
individual  taking the action is called the agent.  The affected party is the principal.  The
principal determines a rule that specifies  a pay-off for the agent as a function of the latter's
action.  The problem acquires interest when there is uncertainty  about the outcome of the
agent's action and when the information  available to the two participants  is costly and
unequal. 3
Information  asymmetries  play a pervasive  role in the principal-agernt  relation and its
implications  for economic  efficiency. Agents typically  know more about their .r ;ks than
their principals and, therefore, may have an incentive to hide or distort information  so as to
serve their interests best.  For instance, if the decision to contain government spendir.g
centers on specific programs, it is usually the bureaucratic  experts supplying  the program
themselves who can define the cost of obtaining  a given level of output.  If the Bureau has
(collectively  or individually)  a vested interest in retaining a high level of cost, its monopoly
nature would help it achieve its goal, because the legislature usually  has no other supplier of
the goods and services with which to compare costs.
At a more findamental level, it is possible  to conceive of principal-agent  relationships
where agents favor difierent principals from thc3e whose interests are supposed  to serve !  If
the government is the agent and the citizens are the principal, the agency relation may
produce detrimental results for the intended principal, if the agent actually caters to the
wrong principal:  regulatory  agencies may cater to their industries instead of consumers,
Ministries  of Defense to their contractors  instead of citizens.  Along the same lines, if the
citizen-principal  is unable to devise and implement appropriate incentives for the
3/  The concepts  of the principal-agent  approach,  as well as some  specific  examples  used in this section,  are drawn
from  Pratt and Zeckhauser  [19851.- 4 -
government-agent,  the latter may lack the motivation  (let alone competence)  to structure
itself so as to produce efficiently.
Such considerations,  and many other similar issues that the theory of public choice
attempt to address, could possibly  provide the answer to some characteristic examples of
excessively  large outlays in the provision of public services.  One may well wonder:  is the
observed  rise in the national  income  share  of the  public sector  the result  of a conscious
response  to private  demand,  or does  it simply  reflect  inefficiency  and wastage  in governrmtnt?
Could it be the case that the increase in government  activity does not reflect a higher flow of
services in any meaningful sense, but is simply the accounting  result of production
inefficiencies? In many cases the beneficiaries  of government  programs would be utterly
surprised to find out the actual cost of a governmental  service compared with their own
perception of the benefit.  In other words, there may be a large discrepancy  between an
individual's own evaluation of benefits and the cost of provision of the relevant good or
service.  Since public output is usually measured  by the inputs used in its production,
excessive costs may also provide  the wrong signals for the allocation  of resources during
the budgetary process.  The transmission  of individuals' demand for public services may thus
be frustrated in two ways:  first, by the failure of the market mechanism;  and second, by the
conscious manipulation  of government  by bureaucrats to their own benefit.  The question
therefore arises:  What are the criteria in assessing  government  activities? How could one
measure the importance  of public programs to the eyes of the citizens?
4.  The evaluation  of public output
These questions are not new in public finance.  Economists  have tried for decades to
devise a scientific  method for evaluating  government spending. The difficulties  in measuring
individual  preferences for public programs arise because there are no markets, no sales, and
no prices in the realm of the government  sector.  Analysts  would have to depend on somt
indirect expression  of personal preferences to assess the contribution  of government  output to
an individual's utility function. But this is not only a measurement  problem.  When we are
asked to comment  on a government  activity, we are likely to take a stance  derived not only
from our interpretation  of the actual economic  role of the state as a supplier of goods and
services, but also from our value judgements concerning  the p  political  role of the state
in such matters.  In oti-  -r words, the evaluation  of public output frequently  includes elements
of both positive and  jormative  economics. It is not surprising, therefore, that many public
finance experts remain skeptical  about the feasibility  of such an evaluation. In the words of
a noted researcher in this area, "the analyst who tries to evaluate government  spending is
embarking upon a quest for fool's gold.  "I
Yet the importance  of assessing  individual  preferences for government  activity cannot
be underestimated. Within the framework of an agency relationship, one may identify
4/  See W. hnwin  Gillespie  [1979J.- 5 -
different levels of interaction: on the one hand, the agents-politicians  are interested in
knowing the wishes of the principals-voters  in order to slant budget expenditures  in a way
that meets the wishes of a majority. On the other hand, the agents-bureaucrats  are also
interested in the preferences of the principals-citizens in order to gauge the behavior  of their
own bureaus against the wishes  of the population.  If, as noted earlier, there is a discrepancy
between the principals the bureaucrats are supposed  to serve and those they actually serve
(as, for example, in the case of a regulatory agency and the respective industry), any major
deviation  of the Bureau's behavior from the majority's wishes is certain to put the agents-
bureaucrats in the spotlight. We therefore observe two direct and one inuirect level of
interaction  between the principals (citizens-voters)  and their agents '  ,liticians  and
bureaucrats): directly the politicians  are expected to favor those projects that are likely to
generate a working majority within a well-defined  political process.  Also directly, the
bureaucrats are expected to rank highly those government  activities that explicitly or
implicitly  would enhance their own pecuniary or nonmonetary  benefits.  At the same time,
indirectly the bureaucrats  are constrained  by the political  process, which reflects the
influence  of the electorate through the direct agency relationship  between politicians and
voters.
This analysis highlights  the primary difficulty  in evaluating public output, namely that
in a complex  dynamic society there are multiple norms and multiple  judges.  It is nearly
impossible  to provide an evaluativr framework  without a set of value judgements. The
analyst must first accept a normative  model of "what ought to be", before he embarks on an
assessment  of the results. This would still be but only the first step.  Following  the choice
of norms, the analyst would have to select a series of indicators that liest approximate the
performance to be evaluated. And at the end, he would have to quantify the indicators in a
measurable  way.  There are many pitfalls along the way, the most important  being the
determination  of a particular indicator by individual  values.  Technicians (economists,
analysts, policy advisors) may find themselves  influenced  in their choice of indicators by
their own complex value judgements  regardless of how much they would like to believe that
they are making a choice on technical grounds alone.
Thinking in terms of a principal-agent  approach helps us at least clarify the issues and
appreciate  the choices with which we are faced. We can identify the three Musgravian
characterizations  of budget theory--allocative,  distributive, and stabilizational--with  the
principal actors involved  in the decision-making  process. Politicians, as agents for the
citizens, their principals, are presumably  interested in all three effects of public spending. In
practice, however, they delegate the allocative  function to the bureaucrats, who are also
supposed  to serve as agents for the citizens, but may not necessarily  do so.  This is where
concerns about waste in government may arise.  The law makers may establish  overseeing
agencies to monitor public programs, but the actual process is left in the hands of the
bureaucrats themselves, who are the sole suppliers  of government  goods and services.  As a
result, bureaucrats have considerable  leeway in deciding the cost of a given level of output.
At the same time, politicians  are more concerned  with the stabilization  and
distributional  aspects of macroeconomic  policy, although  with varying degrees of interest,- 6-
depending  on the current concerns of their constituencies. It is clear, however, that given
the mutually beneficial aspects of the agency relationship,  the politicians  are genuinely
interested  to know the wishes  of their voters and how a particular government  program is
likely to affect their economic welfare. Let us assume that bureaucrats do no deviate from
their agency obligations, that they serve the interests' of their original princinals and that in
so doing tfley try to achieve a Pareto-optimal  production of output.  The question then
formally becomes: If we abstract from allocative  considerations,  can we determine the
distributional  and  tabilizational  effects of government  expenditures, after allowance  for the
behavioral responses of individuals? In other words, assuming  that the government is
responsive  to the welfare of its citizens, what would be the implications  of accepting  the
norms of the principals in the evaluation  of public output? After all, in a democratic society,
citizens are the ultimate principals.
5.  Public output and private decisions
In accepting the citizens' welfare as a criterion for the evaluation  of government
activity, we are reverting to one of the oldest problems  in public finance.  A! the same time,
we are introducing a new important  element, that of behavioral changes as a resdlt of
government  activity.  When individual  objective  functions  are specified, alternative  policies
can be evaluated  in terms of their effects on the individuals' welfare. It is the latter aspect of
the analysis that has given new life to an otherwise  well-researched  area of public economies.
We shall use two specific examples  in order to highlight  the fundamentals  of the argument.
As far as income distribution is concerned, the evaluation of government  programs by
private citizens depends  both on the implicit  price they will have to pay in the form of taxes
and on the substitutability  between a public program and a privately available service.  A
classic example is police protection.  How would the citizens of a community  evaluate a
proposed increase in spending for an expanded  police force?  Assuming  that private
individuals  rationally expect the increased  cost to be covered by additional tax revenue,
people with higher incomes (and, presumably, wealth) would evaluate the proposal more
favorably than the lower-income  population. This conclusion  rests on rather weak rationality
assumptions,  namely that people expect a higher police force to be more effective  in
protecting their property and that individuals  have a declining  marginal utility of income so
that, the higher the income, the lower the disutility from the taxes they pay.  But it also rests
on the strong assumption that public consumption  is independent  of pnvate consumption.
For if individuals  are able to substitute  private protection (in the form of a security system
or, in extreme cases, through private guards) for public protection, it is unclear that they
would evaluate the benefits of an enlarged police force as highly as before.  This reasoning,
therefore, casts doubt on an early argument in this area, namely that a higher-income
individual  would benefit more from a public good and that, therefore, a higher provision of
public goods may have adverse  distributional  implications. The example of the police force
may obviously be extended to a whole range of nonexhaustive  public programs with similar
implications.-7  -
The importance  of such considerations  for the effects of government  activity on
income distribution has led many researchers  to attempt to devise ways to measure the
perceived benefits from public spending to private individuals. The methods have ranged
from (more or less) conti, 'led experiments  in the form of referenda, to revealed preference
approaches through voting behavior, to direct measurement  of behavioral  hypotheses.
However, the success of such approaches  has been doubtful; in the absence of a market
mechanism,  the unobservability  of preferences remains a formidable  problem.
More recently, much attention  has been paid to the behavioral response of the private
sector within the framework  of macroeconomic,  and in particular fiscal, policy.  Specifically,
several researchers have argueA  that some public expenditures  may not have the
macroeconomic  impact usually assumed in conventional  econometric modelling. One
familiar example is the erosion of real wealth  due to inflation. Under inflationary
circumstances,  interest rates are high because they incorporate  an inflation premium over and
above the real return to capital.  Interest payments on public debt, therefore; do not simply
reflect real interest rates; instead, they are also thought  to compensate  creditors of
government  for the erosion of their real wealth.  As a result, it is doubtful that nominal
interest receipts are entirely regarded as income by individuals;  they are mostly construed as
a compensation  for inflation and, to the extent that real wealth has remained unchanged,  are
likely to have little impact on the spending  decisions  of the private sector.
Such an interpretation, which is based on a strong notion of rationality  on the part of
individuals,  although an interesting theoretical  proposition, is ultimately  a hypothesis  sublect
to empirical verification. Additionally,  the same price changes that explain the presence of
an inflation premium in interest payments, also imply the presence of an inflation tax which
allows the government  to extract real resources without  a change in its real monetary
liabilities.  On balance, therefore,  it is not a priori clear what the effect of inflation on
stabilization  policy really is.  Consequently,  measuring  correctly the interpretation  of interest
payments  by the private sector appears to be a precondition  for a meaningful  evaluation of
fiscal policy.5
At a more general level, the effect of public spending on private consumption
behavior  remains an underexplored  area of macroeconomic  policy with potentially  far
reaching ramifications. To the extent that individuals  regard public consumption  as a
substitute  for private consumption  (as, for example, might be the case of school lunches or
health programs), it is reasonable  to assume that private spending  may be a decreasing
function of such government  expenditures. This is an important  proposition, whichr  may
substantially  modify the standard results obtained from conventional  macro-economic
analysis.
One important  implication  of such a proposition is that the traditional  macroeconomic
analysis may also be inadequate  insofar as the stance of fiscal policy is gauged on the basis
5/  For an analysis of this and related issues see Catsambas [19881-8  -
of only total expenditures  (reflected in a global deficit figure) or, alternatively, insofar as
public output is regarded as a homogeneous  entity.  If the reaction of the private sector to
government  spending depends  on the nature of individual  expenditures,  it is prssible  that the
interpretation  of a stabilization  program could be misleading, unless not only the total
amount, but also the cotyiposition  of expenditures  is properly investigated. In otl -,r words, a
disaggregated  framework of government  activities  appears to be a prerequisite  for measuring
the private sector's evaluation  of government  spending.
The measurement  itself is a difficult task as it may not always be possible to
disentangle the influence  of alternative  patterns of public expenditures  on private
consumption  from other exogenous  factors.  But at the same time, the proper interpretation
of the conceptual issues may have such important  implications  for the conduct of fiscal
policy, that an empirical investigation  of the problem would probably ae an inevitable course
of action.  Theory alone cannot  provide an answer, although  it always raises questions.
6.  Conclusions
This essay has discussed  the conceptual  issues associated  with the explanation  and
interpretation of government  growth in the past few decades, the evaluation  of public output
on the part of private individuals, and the effectiveness  of fiscal policy under certain
behavioral modifications  in the presumptive  responses  of the private sector to public
expenditures. The major conclujsions  may be summarized  as follows:
First, the principal-agent  approach provides a good explanation  for the observed
growth of government and suggests  that waste in the public sector may be directly related to
the behavior of bureaucracy  under a system of representative  democracy. It also points out
the difficulties in using a unique criterion for the evaluation  of public output.
Second, if we abstract from the question of allocative  efficiency, issues related to the
distributional  and stabilization  aspects of fiscal policy must take into consideration  the "true"
benefits of public programs, as they are perceived  by the recipients. The implication  here is
that, unless decision makers are relatively  certain about the evaluation of public output by the
private sector, the latter may respond in such a way as to effectively  nullify the specific
government  action.
Third, the practical implication  of this analysis is that more empirical work is
necessary  towards the measurement  of the private sector response to public sector activities.
An important corollary of this reasoning  is that the modelling  of fiscal policy, especially  on
the expenditure side, should be done at a disaggregated  level with a view to isolating the
hypotheses  about the behavioral responses  of the private sector to individual  public programs.-9  -
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